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The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion on the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 
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Definitions of governance and 
the purpose of this paper
The subject of this paper is the development, and the successive modifica­
tions, governance theory, a theory that began by being concerned with the 
steering actions of political authorities as they deliberately attempt to shape 
socio-economic structures and processes. In Germany this goes by the name of 
“Steuerungstheorie” (Mayntz 1987). The English term “governance” has long 
been equated with “governing”, the process aspect of government, thus com­
plementing the institutional perspective of government studies. In other words, 
governance was used roughly as a synonym of “politische Steuerung”.
Recently, however, the term “governance” has been used in two other ways, 
both distinct from political guidance or steering (see figure 1). To distinguish 
these different meanings is not only important in order to avoid misunder­
standings, but also because a change in semantics usually reflects a change in 
perception, whether this in turn reflects changes in reality or not.
For one thing, “governance” is now often used to indicate a new mode of 
governing that is distinct from the hierarchical control model, a more coop­
erative mode where state and non-state actors participate in mixed pub- 
lic/private networks. Governance as an alternative to hierarchical control has 
been studied on the level of national (and sub-national) and of European 
policy-making, and in international relations. The works by Jan Kooiman
(1993) and R.W.A. Rhodes (1997) illustrate the first, the article by Bulmer
(1994) the second, and the book by Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) the third of 
these strands. It is hard to say where exactly this particular meaning of the 
term originated. In the March 1998 issue of the International Social Science 
Journal that is entirely devoted to “governance” in the sense of non-hierarchi- 
cal modes of coordination (UNESCO 1998), the concept is traced to a 1989 
World Bank report, i.e. the international context. In any case it is clear that 
attempts at collective problem-solving outside of existing hierarchical frame­
works, such as we can observe on the European and the international level, 
have contributed significantly to this shift in the meaning of the term gover­
nance.
The second “new” meaning of the term governance is much more general, 
and has a different genealogy. Here governance means the different modes of 




























































































term seems to have grown out of transaction cost economics, more specifically 
Oliver Williamson’s analysis of market and hierarchy as alternative forms of 
economic organization (e.g. Williamson 1979). Williamson’s typology was 
quickly extended to include other forms of social order such as clans, associa­
tions, and - most importantly - networks (e.g. Hollingsworth and Lindberg 
1985; Powell 1990). It was in fact the “discovery” of forms of coordination 
not only different from hierarchy, but also different from the pure market 
form, that led to the generalization of the term “governance” to cover all 
forms of social coordination - not only in the economy, but also in other sec­
tors. In this way, the attention payed to forms of “modern governance” 
(governance in the second meaning of the term) triggered another semantic 
shift. The third meaning of governance now includes the two more narrow 
understandings of the term as sub-types.
Fig. 1
Evolution of the theory of political governance
(1) early 70s
prescriptive theories of planning
(2) 70s
empirical studies of policy development 
(agenda setting, instrument choice, 
role of law, organizational context)
(3) late 70s/early 80s
policy implementation
In the following, I will first sketch the evolution of the theory of political 
governance in the narrow sense of steering (Steuerungstheorie). I shall then 
trace successive paradigm shifts, or modifications of this theoretical frame. 




























































































the theory. To avoid the disappointment that arises from mistaken expecta­
tions, a few disclaimers are in order. It is not the purpose of this paper to 
make a substantive contribution to governance theory, to challenge one of its 
premises or to introduce new theorems. My intention is rather to reflect on the 
development of a certain body of political theory, a development in which I 
have actively participated over more than 20 years. In reconstructing this the­
oretical development it will not be possible to spell out in detail the content of 
the literature I shall refer to, nor shall I attempt to document the unfolding of 
governance theory by extensive references1. An account of the development of 
governance theory can serve to put seemingly separate fields of research into a 
larger context, but it also does more: It raises an important issue about the 
nature of theory development in political science. Does this development fol­
low an internal cognitive dynamic, or is it simply a reflection of changes in 
political reality or in problem perception, as John Dryzek and Stephen 
Leonard (1988) have argued? The answer to this question will indicate 
whether political science is cumulative, building step by step a more inclusive 
theory, or is meandering from topic to topic, following the shift in subjective 
definitions of what is salient.
The development of the core paradigm 
of political governance
The modern theory of political governance (Steuerungstheorie) emerged 
after World War II at a time when governments aspired explicitly to steer 
their nations’ social and economic development in the direction of defined 
goals2. The first paradigm of the theory evolved in three successive phases:
(1) In the late 1960es it began with a - largely prescriptive - theory of 
planning (how to steer).
(2) In the 1970es, with the planning euphoria waning, policy development 
became the object of empirical analyses; this directed attention to con­
text factors influencing policy development, in particular executive 
organization; different policy instruments were discussed, in particular 
the role of law.
For such a documentation, see Mayntz 1996 and the literature cited there.






























































































(3) Finally, in the second half of the 1970es, policy implementation became 
a new research focus.
The first paradigm of a theory of political governance was thus concerned 
with policy development and policy implementation, and it adopted a top- 
down, or legislator’s perspective.
This theory carried in itself the seeds of its own transformation. Implemen­
tation research called attention to the fact of wide-spread policy failure, and 
proved that such failure was not only the consequence of cognitive mistakes in 
planning or of shortcomings on the part of implementation agencies, but of 
having neglected the recalcitrance of the target groups of public policy and 
their ability to resist or subvert the achievement of policy goals. This recogni­
tion led to a first, important enlargement of the initial paradigm. Had it so far 
concentrated on the subject of political steering, government and its ability or 
inability to steer, it now included also the structure and behavioral dispositions 
of the object of political control. In German, this meant to shift the focus from 
Steuerungsfahigkeit to Steuerbarkeit, i.e. governability. In a second step it was 
recognized that governability varies considerably between policy fields (or 
sectors). For instance, policy fields consisting of a specific category of indi­
viduals (e.g. youth) or households (e.g. single-parent households) call for a 
different policy approach than do policy fields dominated by a few big organi­
zations. Thus the top-down perspective of the initial paradigm (policy making 
and implementation) was extended by the inclusion of bottom-up processes of 
selective compliance with policy measures by their target groups, processes 
which are in turn conditioned by the structure of a given regulatory field. This 
expansion of the analytical perspective taught us much about the conditions of 
policy effectiveness.
However, the research that followed, and elaborated, this enlarged 
paradigm undermined what had so far been the basis of the model of political 
governance, i.e. the assumption that the state, even if it meets with resistance 
from target groups, is the control centre of society. The disappointment of the 
belief in the existence of an effective political control centre then directed 
attention to alternative forms of societal governance: In two separate lines of 
discussion, market principles and horizontal self-organization were discussed 
as alternatives to hierarchical political control. This ushered in another exten­
sion of the paradigm.
Market principles were first prominently discussed as a more effective 




























































































market principles became the backbone of the political ideology of neo-liberal- 
ism and Thatcherism, promoting deregulation and privatization as means to 
stimulate economic growth and to increase economic efficiency. Political sci­
entists analyzed the emergence and the policy consequences of this “neo-con­
servatism”, using the analytical framework of policy analysis (e.g. Dohler 
1990). More recently the demise of state socialism strengthened the belief in 
the ordering power of the market. Meanwhile, however, attention has turned 
to the potential contradictions between market principles (or capitalism) and 
democracy (e.g. Dunn 1990, Katz 1997, Kitschelt 1985), an issue that so far 
has not been part of governance theory. The development of governance the­
ory, even of governance theory applied specifically to economic organization, 
focused instead on the second alternative to hierarchical control, i.e. coopera­
tive and horizontal forms of societal self-regulation and of policy develop­
ment. In other words, attention turned to governance in the second of the three 
senses distinguished above.
Fig. 2





4 ^  extension: 
51*1 extension:
policy development (by government)
+ policy implementation (by public agencies)
include bottom-up perspective:
sectoral structure and target group behavior
include policy-development and 
implementation in public/private networks 
and self-regulating societal systems
include effect of European policy upon 
domestic sectoral structures and policy-making
include European level of policy-making





























































































At the centre of this new line of discussion were different kinds of negotiat­
ing systems. Along the way, traditional forms of what might generally be 
called societal self-regulation also received new attention, in particular local 
self-government and the so-called “third sector” of private, non-profit service 
organizations, but this is not what is usually meant by “modern governance”. 
The two major types of negotiating systems are neocorporatist arrangements, 
or more generally mixed public/private policy networks, and systems of soci­
etal self-regulation in which the state does not directly participate, such as the 
institutionalized wage bargaining system between capital and labor 
(Tarifsystem) or the self-government of the German public health system, in 
which the organizations of health fund physicians and of public hospitals bar­
gain with health fund representatives about fees. Another form of societal self­
regulation are the so-called private interest governments (Streeck and Schmit- 
ter 1985). Here opposing interests are not represented by independent organi­
zations, but are internalized within regulatory regimes that subject the activi­
ties of private agents to a self-imposed discipline; the German technical stan­
dardization agency DIN is a case in point (Voelzkow 1996).
By the middle of the eighties, the theoretical discussion was dominated by 
the terms decentralization, cooperation, and network. This was quite in line 
with the spirit of the times, which was set against all manifestations of hierar­
chical authority, whether by parents, teachers, or the state. However, it was 
quickly realized that the problem-solving capacity of public/private networks 
and of societal self-regulation may be limited. Networks typically emerge 
where power is dispersed among the agents in a policy field, but where coop­
eration is necessary for the sake of effectiveness. As the various public and/or 
private agents in a policy field typically have different interests, this poses the 
problem of how to agree on an effective problem-solution without shifting the 
costs this implies to outsiders (Scharpf 1993). The discussion of this issue 
within the framework of governance theory is an elaboration, rather than a 
further extension, of the theoretical paradigm as it had evolved by now.
A second important line of elaboration started from the observation that, 
from the viewpoint of the original, top-down conception of political gover­
nance, the negotiation of political with societal actors in policy networks or 
neo-corporatist structures and the delegation of regulatory functions to insti­
tutions of local or sectoral self-government indicate a loss of steering capacity. 
The state appeared weak, “semi-sovereign” (Katzenstein 1987) - a perspective 
consonant with modern systems theory and with concepts of post-modernism, 
both of which are characterized by viewing society as centreless, or polycen­




























































































made it clear that what we are dealing with is not so much a loss of finite ' 
trol, but rather a change in its form. Societal self-regulation takes placé^/çfter^Ç^ 
all, within an institutional framework that is underwritten by the state. The 
state does not only legitimize, but has often enough helped to establish various 
forms of self-government. Where state actors participate in policy networks, 
they are a very special and privileged kind of participant; they retain crucial 
means of intervention, and this holds even where decision-making has been 
devolved to institutions of societal self-government. In particular, the state 
retains the right of legal ratification, the right to authoritative decision where 
societal actors do not come to a conclusion (e.g. in negotiations about technical 
standards), and the right to intervene by legislative or executive action where a 
self-governing system such as the German health system fails to meet regula­
tory expectations. Thus, hierarchical control and societal self-regulation are 
not mutually exclusive. They are different ordering principles which are very 
often combined, and their combination, self-regulation “in the shadow of hier­
archy”, can be more effective than either of the “pure” governance forms 
(Mayntz and Scharpf 1995).
Challenges to governance theory: 
Europeanization and globalization
Having arrived at this point, the basic frame of a theory of political gover­
nance seems complete. But meanwhile new problems have arisen, notably the 
crisis of the welfare state that is connected with European integration and eco­
nomic globalization. In the light of Europeanization and globalization, certain 
accepted and apparently unproblematic features of the previously sketched 
theory of governance appear suddenly as deficits, deficits which can trigger a 
new phase in theory development by challenging governance theory to extend 
its analytical frame once more. The deficits in question are;
-  the concentration on the single nation state (even where international 
comparisons are made),
-  the selective concern with domestic politics - a point closely linked to the 
first, and
-  the concentration on policy effectiveness, on the output and outcome of 





























































































The theory of political governance has so far dealt with political systems 
that have a clear identity, a clear boundary, and a defined membership which 
implies specific rights and duties. This kind of approach is incapable of dealing 
with the problems raised by European integration, and especially with the 
problems raised by globalization.
The formation of the European Union has established a new, transnational 
governance structure. The European Union is decidedly more than a regime, a 
contractual frame or a negotiating arena, but it is as clearly not a federal state; 
it can best be described as a complex multi-level system whose dynamics can­
not well be understood in the conceptual frame developed for the analysis of 
political governance in nation states. Private interest governments, for in­
stance, are still largely of a national scope. The tripartite configurations, or 
triangles, that at the national level link political parties, interest groups and 
government agencies, or the neocorporatist arrangements linking the state, 
employers, and organized labour, are not structurally replicated at the Euro­
pean level. There are no true European political parties, organized labour is 
only weakly represented, and the representation of industry is even much 
more diversified and complex than on the national level. New categories are 
needed for the analysis of European policy-making and implementation^.
For a theory of political governance, European integration has two conse­
quences: (1) it raises new problems of governance on the national level, and 
(2) it requires the extension of governance theory to a supra-national level.
Ad (1): The shift of powers to the European level requires us to study the 
effect of European directives upon various sectors of the national economy 
(agriculture, food stuffs, the banking and insurance sector, energy, railroads, 
road transport, etc.). This is in fact being done (e.g. Schneider 1988, Lutz 
1998). In this way the previous paradigm is extended once again, this time by 
adding an important external factor of policy formation and implementation. 
European policy decisions affect the conditions of effective domestic policy 
resting in the structure of the regulatory field, and at the same time restrict the 
freedom of national policy choice. This results in a loss - this time a genuine 
loss - of control capacity for national governments (Scharpf 1997). But this 
loss does not only follow from the shift of legislative and regulatory compe­
tences from the national to the European level; it also follows from European 
market integration, the gradual dissolution of national economic boundaries.
This does not mean that the European Union is a sui generis case that can only be 




























































































The consequences for national economies are intensified competition and in­
creasing mobility of productive capital and of finance capital. This creates new 
problems for national tax regimes and tax policy, national economic policy, 
and last not least the national welfare state, problems that have in fact all 
become prominent topics in political science research4.
Ad (2) We can also observe the growth of a field called “European policy­
making” (e.g. Héritier, Knill, and Mingers 1996; Richardson 1996). What is 
not yet clear is whether this will, in the long run, become a separate field of 
study, or remain a genuine extension of existing governance theory. The latter 
requires that such studies are not undertaken in a comparative perspective of 
policy sectors, but focus on the interconnection between different levels of 
policy-making. In other words, the object of study would not be what happens 
in Brussels (or between Brussels and StraBburg), but the mutual interdepen­
dence between national and European policy processes in a multi-level system.
Concern with European policy-making also calls attention to the third blind 
spot of the national governance paradigm mentioned above. It is a peculiarity 
of European policy-making that democratic elements are largely lacking, or at 
least weakly developed. As Fritz Scharpf (1998) demonstrates, rule-making by 
the European Commission is based on technical expertise wherever action goes 
beyond the implementation of the common interest of all member states. 
Where national interests diverge, which is generally the case for decisions with 
redistributive consequences, technical expertise alone cannot legitimate inter­
ventions. Where redistributive decisions require full consensus, the result will 
simply be blockade. Decisions with redistributive effects are tolerated only 
within stable communities (we-groups), and only if they have been arrived at 
by democratic procedures. The European Union meets neither of these pre­
conditions; It is not a socially integrated system, and it lacks a European-wide 
democratic decision process.
The discussion about a European democracy deficit makes us aware that 
what is clearly lacking in European policy-making - a fully developed and well 
functioning democratic input process - has apparently been taken for granted 
at the national level, an assumption that permitted to neglect the political input 
process in the analysis of national policy making5. In retrospect it is indeed 
surprising how long democracy theory and the theory of (national) political
4 The present research program of the Max-Planck-Institute for the Study of Societies in 
Cologne is nearly entirely devoted to these problems.




























































































governance have remained isolated from each other. When governance theory 
came to focus on horizontal cooperation and policy formation within net­
works, it was recognized that this raises the problem of democratic account­
ability, because the private actors in policy networks typically lack democratic 
legitimation. Horizontal cooperation and negotiation in networks can be no 
substitute for democracy, even though, in view of the difficulty of represent­
ing very specific interests within a system of general elections, the develop­
ment of policy networks that include representatives of opposing socio-politi­
cal interests is sometimes seen as a more practicable modern form of interest 
representation. Helmut Voelzkow (1996) is one author who has explicitly dealt 
with the tension between these two different forms of interest representation. 
If this tension is not recognized there is the danger that a governance theory 
highlighting horizontal cooperation and societal self-regulation leads inadver­
tently to a renaissance of old corporatist models (see Bowen 1971). But to rec­
ognize the existence of a problem of accountability where policy-making oc­
curs in mixed public/private networks is not the same as trying to include the 
input part of the policy process explicitly into the theoretical paradigm of 
political governance. This challenge has not been met so far, and it is indeed a 
question whether an integration of democracy theory and governance theory 
as we know it would overextend the latter. Still, it might be worthwhile to 
pursue this path of theory development a few steps further.
While political science has responded, at least partly, to the challenges 
which Europeanization poses to governance theory, this does not equally hold 
for the challenges connected with globalization. Globalization is in fact a much 
more serious challenge to any theory of political governance. At the European 
level it is, in principle, still possible to talk of a policy process with its input 
and output aspects. This is no longer possible at the global level where there 
exists no identifiable steering subject, and no institutionalized framework con­
taining the object of steering. What is, often rather vaguely, referred to by 
“globalization” has not resulted in the formation of a new higher order system, 
a truly transnational system with its own identity, boundary and membership 
roles. This of course raises the question whether the structures and processes 
generated by globalization can still be a subject for the theory of governance. 
This question can be answered affirmatively if, and only if, we speak of gov­
ernance in the widest sense of basic modes of coordination, because only in 
this case is the concept not tied to the existence of some sort of a political con­
trol structure.
Globalization is usally taken to refer to two interrelated processes (e.g. 




























































































-  expanding communication, both transport and information exchange, 
and growing personal mobility (migration!), meaning that the formation of 
social groups becomes increasingly independent of geographical location;
-  the emergence of global markets for capital, goods and services, as a 
consequence of liberalization, deregulation, and the growing ease of communi­
cation.
As in the case of European integration, these processes raise both (1) new 
problems for a theory of national political governance, and (2) issues of 
transnational governance different from European integration.
Ad (1) Though national governments have themselves spurred the process 
of globalization through policies of liberalization and deregulation, they are 
now forced to consider how to respond to the challenges it raises. There are 
basically three different strategies. One strategy is unilateral adaptation; the 
possible measures are similar to those that are being discussed in relation to 
the European common market, which means that this issue is already being 
covered in contemporary research. A second strategy is protectionism and 
isolationism; at the most, this adds a new policy problem to the catalogue of 
domestic policies already dealt with by policy studies. A third strategy would 
be efforts to ward off specific impacts (e.g. illegal immigration) by interna­
tional coordination. At this point we are leaving the national level of analysis 
and must turn to the issue of transnational governance.
Ad (2) Problems of international coordination beyond the European context 
have been studied for some time already by scholars of international relations 
(e.g. Krasner 1983). This sub-discipline of political science evolved quite sep­
arate from (national) governance theory. In international relations, the actors 
and negotiating partners are states that stand in a relationship of strategic 
interdependence. This is the reason why there exists an obvious affinity 
between international relations and game theory. The international relations 
approach assumes that nation states are the most important actors on the global 
scene. This perspective is misleading if we take a closer look at the governance 
issues that present themselves at the global level.
Globalization does not simply mean that economic and non-economic rela­
tionships become increasingly transnational. There is more movement across 
national boundaries - movement of goods, services, capital, information, sci­
entific knowledge, and last not least of people. This results in new, often one­




























































































died competition for instance is increasing, though it does not affect all 
branches of national economies in the same way. New transnational markets 
are less well regulated and hence tend more toward atomism and anarchy than 
has been true of market relationships contained within nation-states. This also 
means an increase in uncontrolled negative externalities, ecological as well as 
social and economic. There is a growing disjunction between increasingly 
unbounded and farflung economic and communicative networks on the one 
hand, and bounded political systems on the other hand, a disjunction between 
problem structures and regulatory structures that might cope with these prob­
lems. In response to this situation, conscious efforts have been made, and con­
tinue to be made, to institute transnational regulatory structures. The UN is of 
course the most inclusive of such structures, a conglomerate of sub-organiza­
tions and special organs ranging from a simple forum (UNCED = UN Confer­
ence on the environment and sustainable development) to corporate actors such 
as the World Bank, with UNESCO, ILO, WHO and WTO possibly somewhere 
in between (Rittberger et al. 1997).
To investigate the emergence and functioning of transnational regulatory 
structures beyond the EU is certainly a fascinating agenda for a theory of 
political governance. But this is not where the challenge ends. Globalization 
poses yet another theoretical problem: The problem of the co-existence of 
many different types of structures and processes, i.e. different governance 
modes. Market models and the non-linear dynamics of ecological systems seem 
best able to deal with the aggregate outcomes of a fragmented, but interdepen­
dent global economy. In the structurally diffuse context created by globaliza­
tion, specific events or changes often cannot be causally attributed to the 
behaviour of identifiable actors. Situations of recognized strategic interdepen­
dence that can guide the choice among alternatives are rare. In the global mar­
ket, most agents play, as it were, most of the time “against nature”. At the 
same time, however, the transnational scene is not devoid of structure. The 
new regulatory structures have already been mentioned. There are, further­
more, many kinds of international as well as transnational organizations - the 
large multi-national corporations, transnational professional associations, 
interest organizations and scientific organizations. Finally there exist transna­
tional epistemic communities and social movements, incipient social groups 
without a clear geographical reference. Together, these various transnational 
groupings, regimes and organizations, with their often fluid boundaries and 
cross-cutting domains, their mutual and one-sided dependencies, form a 
structure of such complexity that it seems to defy all our analytical efforts: 
What confronts us here is truly Habermas’ “neue Uniibersichtlichkeit” 




























































































of the different modes of social ordering, all of the different types of actor 
configurations beyond hierarchies and networks, their combinations and par­
ticularly their interactions, might we be able to address the issues created by 
transnationalization and globalization. Should such a theory emerge, it would 
have to be a governance theory of a very different kind from the one we 
started with in this account.
What is an obvious theoretical problem on the global level alerts to the exis­
tence of an analytical dimension that also applies at the national level. Gover­
nance studies at the national level have typically used an approach that has 
come to be called actor-centered institutionalism (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995, 
Scharpf 1997), i.e. they are concerned with actors acting and interacting 
within institutional frameworks. The actors whose decisions (and non-deci­
sions) are studied to explain policy outcomes are normally corporate actors: 
agencies, organizations, associations (represented, of course, by individuals). 
Simple “populations”, collections of many individuals responding to given 
stimuli in the same way, normally play a role only as target groups of some 
policy. Aggregate effects arising from the uncoordinated actions of many 
individuals appear only as parameters in policy analyses, not as a process to be 
explained within the theoretical framework of governance. Only in exceptional 
cases do we find an analysis of the interplay between steering attempts on the 
part of corporate actors, and processes of collective behavior that evolve first 
for reasons of their own, but may then motivate, and later on also react to, 
political interventions. In the sectoral studies of the transformation processes 
in East Germany there are some analyses of this kind (e.g. Wasem 1997). But 
in general the fact that processes following different logics - collective behav­
ior, market exchange, bargaining, negotiation, and authoritative intervention - 
co-exist and are causally interrelated has not been a topic in (national) gover­
nance theory.
Whether this can be called a deficit of governance theory in particular is, 
however, an open question. Parallel to what has been argued for a global gov­
ernance theory it may well be that to extend the paradigm to include pari 
passu, i.e. on an equal footing all the distinguishable forms of coordination, or 
social ordering, would ovcr-extend it, making it loose the necessary amount of 
selective attention that is a prerequisite of theory-building - for human minds 
at least. In any case we would no longer deal with a theory of political gover­
nance, but with a much more comprehensive theory of social dynamics, i. e. 





























































































In this paper, I have traced through several stages the development of a 
body of theory concerned with the forms and problems of social and political 
guidance. In retrospect, this development looks like the successive unfolding of 
a cognitive agenda, driven step by step by the awareness of blind spots and of 
deficits in explanatory power vis-a-vis observable reality. There have been 
some interesting bifurcations in the process, e.g. when governance theory con­
centrated on horizontal cooperation rather than the market as alternative to 
hierarchical authority, and there are still blind spots in the theory to which it 
has not reacted. But until now, this has been a cumulative cognitive process 
that did not follow the developmental logic of political science described by 
John Dryzek and Stephen Leonard (1988), who argued that the objects of 
political science are historically contingent, wherefore political scientists must 
continually begin to develop new and different analytical frames and substan­
tive theories that cannot build upon each other. At least in the case of gover­
nance theory (which is, of course, not all there is to political science) we find 
instead a successive extension of the initial framework, not its suppression and 
exchange for a new one, i.e not a paradigm shift in the radical Kuhnian sense 
(Kuhn 1962). In this development, changes in political reality have played an 
important role, influencing the direction in which the paradigm was being 
extended. The modern state has in fact become more “cooperadve”, networks 
have proliferated, and European integration is a new phenomenon. These 
observable real changes were challenges that could be accommodated by 
extending the paradigm. But with globalization, there may well have come the 
point where a further extension of the paradigm would be dysfunctional, and 
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